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ONE DAY CRIMINAL CAREERS:
THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT'S
DIFFERENT OCCASIONS PROVISION
JENNY W.L. OSBORNE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It took Thomas Hudspeth and two accomplices exactly thirtysix minutes to burglarize three adjacent stores in an Illinois
shopping mall, chopping through the wall to get from one store to
another, an escapade that led to a three-count felony indictment.
Although he was no doubt unaware of it at the time, Mr. Hudspeth
had become a career criminal in just over half an hour. Eight years
later, when Mr. Hudspeth was caught with a gun in violation of
federal law,' his ill-advised night at the mall caught up with him.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that his three
mall burglaries had been "committed on occasions different from
one another," triggering a mandatory minimum fifteen-year
2
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA").
Joe McElyea was luckier. Like the hapless Mr. Hudspeth, he
too burgled adjoining stores in a strip mall, and even employed the
same tactic of chopping through the wall to get from one store to
the other. When he was later caught with a gun, however, he was
spared the fifteen-year enhancement because the court said it
could not determine whether the strip mall burglaries had actually
occurred on different occasions. 3The record did not indicate how
long Mr. McElyea had remained in each store or whether it had
perhaps been his accomplice who had entered the other store.
While the record had been equally vague in Hudspeth's case, the

* J.D. May 2011, UCLA School of Law
1. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) prohibits possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.
2. United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1994). The
ACCA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185, codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (2006), provides: "[A] person who violates section 922(g) of this title
and has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one
another . .. shall be .. . imprisoned not less than fifteen years . . . ."
3. United States v. McElyea, 158 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1998).
963
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court relied on police reports, 4 concluding that he committed three
separate burglaries against three separate victims in three
separate locations.5
Repeat offenders have been the subject of enhanced
sentencing laws since colonial times.6 There are at least two
federal recidivist statutes in addition to ACCA,7 and nearly every
state has its own sentencing enhancement provision for repeat
offenders.8 ACCA is different. Intended to target the small group
of "hard core" habitual offenders responsible for the lion's share of
violent crime, ACCA has instead been applied as frequently to
defendants with relatively minor criminal records and no history
of serious violence.9 The offender who commits several burglaries
(or makes several drug sales) in the space of a few hours is
fundamentally different from the career criminal who we imagine
to be in and out of detention-the so-called "revolving door"
criminal. Yet, the courts have interpreted ACCA to make no
distinction. As a result, the fifteen-year enhancement has been
applied to hundreds of defendants like Thomas Hudspeth and Joe
McElyea, who most people would not describe as "career
criminals."
There seems to be no logical reason why Mr. Hudspeth's strip
mall burglaries made him a career criminal, while Mr. McElyea's
did not. This Article argues that the outcome in Hudspeth's case
should have been the same as in McElyea's as far as the purpose of
ACCA is concerned, and that it would have been the same if both
courts had followed the same procedure for considering the record
4. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1018 n.3, 1021.
5. Id.
6. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998)
("Recidivism laws 'have a long tradition in this country that dates back to
colonial times'(citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992))).
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) ("If any person commits a violation of this
subparagraph or of section 409, 418, 419, or 420 [21 U.S.C.S. §§ 849, 859, 860,
or 861 (2006)] after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense
have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without release and fined in accordance with the preceding
sentence."); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) ("[A] person who is convicted
in a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment if the person has been convicted ... of two or more serious
violent felonies; or one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious
drug offenses . . . .").

8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 13A-5-9 (2011) (providing enhanced
penalties for "[riepeat or habitual offenders"); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-501, 5-4504 (1987) (same); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2011) (same); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 667 (2010) (same); COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801 (2004) (same); 11 DEL.
CODE ANN. § 4214 (2011) (same).
9. See David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy:
Learning Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guideline Era,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 53 (2008) (noting ACCA's application to "petty offenders
... [who] had never been to state prison for their crimes .

... ).
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of prior convictions. It argues further that the procedure followed
by the Ninth Circuit in McElyea is now compelled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Shepard v. United States,'0 and also by the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Shepard restricts the
evidence that a sentencing court may rely upon to prove a prior
conviction under ACCA in order to avoid the sort of judicial factfinding found constitutionally impermissible in Apprendi v. New
Jersey." In Apprendi, the Court held that under the Sixth
Amendment, any fact except the fact of a prior conviction that
increases a sentence beyond the maximum authorized by statute
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
ACCA sentences rely on the fact of a prior conviction-the
Apprendi exception-it is the inquiry into the circumstances of
those prior convictions that concerned the Shepard Court. With
the Sixth Amendment in mind, the Shepard Court specifically
prohibited the use of police reports-which informed the Seventh
Circuit's factual conclusion in Hudspeth-to determine whether a
prior felony was violent for purposes of ACCA.
Shepard was just one of nine ACCA cases to reach the
Supreme Court in the last six years.12 All but three of these cases
challenged the definition of a violent felony under the statute's
residual clause.13 Much of the ACCA scholarship has focused on
this issue as well.14 But equally, if not more, troubling is the way
10. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
11. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court
held that under the Sixth Amendment any fact-except the fact of a prior
conviction-that increases a sentence beyond the maximum authorized by
statute must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
12. Shepard, 544 U.S. 13; James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007);
Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007); United States v. Rodriguez, 553
U.S. 377 (2008); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); Chambers v.
United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265
(2010); Sykes, 131 S. Ct. 2267; McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218
(2011).
13. A violent felony under ACCA is defined as "any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). The
following cases address the definition of violent felony under ACCA's residual
clause: Shepard, 544 U.S. 13; James, 550 U.S. 192; Begay, 553 U.S. 137;
Chambers, 555 U.S. 122; Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 1265; Sykes, 131 S.Ct. 2267.
14. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Bright, Violent Felonies Under the Residual Clause
of the Armed Career Criminal Act: Whether Carrying a Concealed Handgun
Without a Permit Should Be Considered a Violent Felony, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 601
(2010) (discussing whether carrying concealed handgun should be considered a
violent felony); David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The
Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209
(2010) (proposing a more faithful interpretation of ACCA's residual clause
after Begay and Chambers); Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 52-53 (discussing
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in which prior convictions are counted towards the severe fifteenyear sentencing enhancement. A challenge to the interpretation of
an "occasion" has yet to reach the Supreme Court despite ongoing
inconsistencies in the lower courts, and Congress has made no
changes to the statute since 1988. However, with continuous
Supreme Court attention to ACCA's residual clause15-and Justice
Scalia's recent call to declare ACCA constitutionally void for
vagueness 1 6-Congress may decide to intervene. 17 If it does, such
an intervention would present an opportunity to amend the
different occasions provision by requiring an intervening
conviction or arrest between prior offenses.
Until then, this Article proposes that courts place a higher
burden on the government to prove the separateness of prior
convictions before applying an ACCA enhancement. In doing so,
courts should explicitly apply the Shepard source restriction to the
different occasions inquiry and clarify what sources are
permissible under Shepard. But this is only part of the problem.
The interpretation of an occasion that treats Thomas Hudspeth's
mall burglaries as offenses occurring on different occasions defies
a common sense understanding of the word. It also results in
inconsistent and arbitrary outcomes. In the face of a vaguely
drafted statute, it is within the power of the courts to develop a
sensible standard that more faithfully considers the purpose of
ACCA.
Part II of this Article discusses ACCA's overinclusive and
arbitrary application. It begins by examining the statute's
legislative history and explores how this history led to ACCA's
expansive application and the courts' problematic interpretation of
the different occasions provision. Part III analyzes the judicial and
judicial reaction to the broad definition of a violent felony under ACCA);
Thomas W. Hillier, Comparing Three Strikes and the ACCA- Lessons to Learn,
7 FED. SENT. R. 78 (1994) (noting the broad range of conduct counts as a
violent felony under ACCA); James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career
CriminalAct and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:Moving Toward Consistency,
46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 558 (2009) (proposing amendments to the
substantive categories of predicate offenses that count as violent crime under
ACCA's residual clause).
15. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Sykes, "[t]he residual-clause
series will be endless, and we will be doing ad hoc application of ACCA to the
vast variety of state criminal offenses until the cows come home." 131 U.S. at
2287.
16. In the fourth ACCA case to reach the Supreme Court since 2007,
Justice Scalia declared "[flour times is enough. We should admit that ACCA's
residual provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness." Id.
at 2284.
17. Indeed, Senator Specter, one of the original drafters of the statute,
introduced an ACCA reform bill in the 111th Congress before he left office that
proposed to clarify the definition of a violent felony under the Act. Armed
Career Criminal Sentencing Act of 2010, S. 4045, 111th Cong. (2010).
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scholarly proposals for limiting the scope of the different occasions
provision, many of which would require congressional amendment
of the statute. Part IV considers a new development in Supreme
Court precedent that has presented an additional tool grounded in
the Sixth Amendment to limit ACCA's reach. It examines how the
different occasions inquiry has been affected by the Supreme
Court's decision in Shepard and suggests that the best hope of a
more appropriate application of the statute lies in this direction.
Specifically, this Article argues in Part IV that Shepard has
narrowed Apprendi's prior conviction exception with significant
implications for ACCA. Finally, in Part V, this Article proposes
that to avoid raising Sixth Amendment concerns, and to limit
ACCA enhancements to cases in which they are truly warranted,
the government should be required to establish through reliable
judicial records that the offenses underlying prior convictions
occurred on genuinely different occasions.
II. ACCA's OVERINCLUSIVE AND ARBITRARY APPLICATION

A. Legislative History of ACCA
The Armed Career Criminal Act was enacted during a period
of growing federal concern about violent street crime. iSIn
particular, Congress was concerned with those few criminals who
were responsible for a disproportionate share of violent crime, and
sought to ensure that they were punished severely under federal
law.
What eventually became ACCA was first introduced in 1983
as a three strikes bill with a mandatory life sentence after a third
armed burglary or robbery.19 Congress rejected this version of the
bill in response to concerns that a life sentence may not be
warranted in every case, 20 and Senator Arlen Specter reintroduced

18. Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime
Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUSTICE 377, 394 (2006) (describing the growing
federal emphasis on prosecuting violent crimes). Congress came on board to
support the war on crime and drugs, passing a series of laws in the 1980s and
1990s that increased penalties for traditionally state law offenses, primarily
those involving drugs and firearms. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473; Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101647, 104 Stat. 4789; and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, H.R. 3355, Pub. L. No. 103-322.
19. Career CriminalLife Sentence Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 1688, S. 1689,
and S. 1690 Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,97th Cong. (1982) [hereinafter CCLSA Hearings].
20. See S. REP. No. 97-585, at 77 (1982) ("[It was recognized that requiring
a life sentence for robbery and burglary was unprecedented.").
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the bill with a reduced mandatory penalty of fifteen years. 21
Violent crime, and robbery and burglary in particular, were on the
rise and state prosecutions were not doing enough to keep violent
repeat offenders in prison. 22 ACCA was intended to devote federal
resources to the prosecution of these repeat robbers and burglars. 23
The advantages of federal prosecutions in a limited number of
cases would be "(1) faster trials; (2) more restrictive bail; and (3)
longer, surer sentences." 24 Congress cautioned prosecutors,
however, to seek ACCA enhancements in federal court on a limited
basis. 25 Recognizing that the statute federalized the traditionally
local crimes of armed robbery and armed burglary when
committed a third time, the bill emphasized that local prosecutors
would retain primary control over potential ACCA cases. 26
These federalism concerns ultimately killed the three strikes
bill when President Reagan refused to sign the crime package into
law, citing concerns with the relationship between federal and
local prosecutors. 27 Senator Specter and Congressman Ron Wyden
(D-OR) introduced a revised bill in the 98th Congress that
21. S. 1688, 97th Cong. (1982). Persons committing armed robbery or
armed burglary after having been twice convicted of such crimes were subject
to a mandatory minimum fifteen year sentence. Id. The mandatory minimum
was set at fifteen years based on research indicating a criminal career usually
begins at age fifteen and ends at age thirty. See S. REP. No. 97-585, at 77
(explaining the rationale behind the fifteen-year mandatory minimum).
22. See S. REP. No. 98-190, at 3, 6 (1983). "Robbery and burglary are more
prevalent and have increased faster than any other type of violent crime." Id.
at 3.
23. See Armed Career CriminalAct: Hearingon H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19
(1984) (noting the benefits of the Act on both federal and state prosecutions).
24. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 2.
25. See S. REP. No.97-585, at 6 ("The bill contemplates diverting a limited
number of selected cases from State to Federal court for prosecution.").See also
id. at 8 ("S. 1688 is intended to supplement state prosecutions, not supersede
them. ... In those jurisdictions, those times, and those specific types of armed
robberies and burglaries where the results in the State courts are not
adequate, S. 1688 would provide an auxiliary means for protecting public
safety."); see id. at 65-66:
It is likely that in the vast majority of the several thousand county courts
in the United States, few if any cases, would be brought under S. 1688.
The statute would only be seriously reviewed for possible application in a
relatively small number of jurisdictions when in a relatively small
percentage of the cases there was a real question about the ability of the
state courts to achieve justice.
26. See S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 10 ("S. 1688 contemplates that ordinarily
prosecutions under the Act would be initiated upon request of the local
prosecuting authority.").
27. See S. REP. No. 98-190, at 3 ("President Reagan declined to sign the
[larger crime package of which the bill was a part]. . . . He . . . expressed
concern about the jurisdictional nature of the local prosecutor's 'veto' power
over Federal prosecutions contained in the career criminal portion of the
bill.").
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attempted to address the Administration's concerns. 28 President
Reagan pocket vetoed the bill.
The House eventually proposed making ACCA a penalty
provision for violating the federal law prohibiting people with
felony convictions from possessing firearms.2 9 As finally enacted in
1984,30 ACCA applied a fifteen-year mandatory penalty to
individuals with three prior convictions for armed robbery or
armed burglary who were found to be in possession of a firearm.3
By triggering the statute's application after the violation of a
federal crime, the bill eliminated federalism concerns. 32 However,
by using what is essentially a status offense as a trigger, the
House bill paved the way for a greatly expanded application of the
statute. It placed no time limitations on what might qualify as a
prior conviction-despite Senator Specter's conclusion that a
criminal career usually ends at age thirty3 3-and included no
requirement that predicate convictions be separated in time from
one another, or indeed even from the triggering offense. In 1986,
after concerns over undue interference with local prosecutors
dissipated, 34 the statute was amended to broaden the scope of
prior offenses to "a crime of violence or a serious drug offense."35
The inclusion of drug offenses was based on the belief that "drugs
and violent crime go hand-in-hand." 36 Congress's failure to define
precisely the offenses that would count as ACCA predicates would
occupy the Supreme Court's docket for years to come.37
28. S. 52, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. 6248, 98th Cong. (1984).
29. H.R. REP. No.98-1073, at 5 (1984).
30. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185
(1984).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See S. REP. No. 97-585, at 7 (noting that a criminal career "usually
starts at about age 15 and continues to about age 30").
34. The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 2312
Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 1 (1986).
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden).
37. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (developing a categorical
approach to determine whether a prior offense constitutes a violent felony
under ACCA's residual clause); Shepard, 544 U.S. at 19 (limiting the sources
upon which a sentencing court may rely when determining whether an offense
underlying a guilty plea constitutes an ACCA predicate); James, 550 U.S. 192
(concluding that attempted burglary is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA);
Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377 (interpreting the maximum term of imprisonment for
purposes of a "serious drug offense" under ACCA to incorporate recidivist
enhancements); Begay, 553 U.S. at 148 ("We . . . conclude that . . . 'driving

under the influence' falls outside the scope of [ACCA's residual clause].");
Chambers, 555 U.S. at 130 ("[WMe conclude that [failure to report to a penal
institution] falls outside the scope of ACCA's definition of 'violent felony."');
Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1272 (holding that Florida's definition of battery is not
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1. Identifying the CareerCriminal
The original bill made clear the statute's intended narrow
reach. 38 The Senate Report on the bill that originally passed in
both the House and the Senate stated that the bill targeted the
"most dangerous, frequent, and hardened offenders," 39 those
"small number of repeat offenders [who] commit a highly
disproportionate amount of the violent crime plaguing America
today." 40 The bill was "very narrowly aimed at the hard core of
career criminals with long records for robbery and burglary
offenses who now have 'graduated' to the point of dangerousness
and recklessness that they are using firearms to commit further
robberies and burglaries." 41 This narrow focus was incorporated
into the later ACCA bills. 42 At a House hearing on the bill that was
finally passed into law, then Assistant Attorney General Stephen
Trott testified about the type of people the statute would target:
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their
definition, that locking them up and letting them go doesn't do any
good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let them go, it doesn't
do any good, they are back for a third time. At that juncture, we
should say, "That's it; time out; it is all over. We, as responsible
people, will never give you the opportunity to do this again."43
In other words, the statute, according to Trott, envisioned
individuals who continued committing crimes after being convicted
and serving time in prison.
The statute was drafted based, in part, on recidivism research
indicating that two prior robbery or burglary convictions were a
reliable proxy for a higher rate of reoffending. 44 Incorporating the
a violent felony under ACCA's residual clause); Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277
("Felony vehicle flight is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA."); McNeill, 131
S. Ct. 2218 (holding that drug offenses with a maximum term of imprisonment

of ten years or more at time of conviction are serious drug offenses under
ACCA).
38. S. REP. No. 97-585, at 4.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 20. The report relied on research indicating that "approximately
six percent of the offenders commit between 50 and 70 percent of the violent
crime." Id.
41. Id. at 62-63. The original bill strictly limited ACCA prosecutions to
those robberies and burglaries that are committed with a firearm and by
repeat offenders with "substantial" criminal records whio "specialize] in
robbery and burglary offenses." Id. at 62.
42. See S. REP. No. 98-190, at 3 ("S. 52 [the revised bill] is substantially
similar to S. 1688 [the original bill]" and only "technical changes were made.").
43. Armed Career CriminalAct: Hearingon H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong. 64 (1984).
44. See S. REP. No. 97-585, at 21 (reporting on a study by the Rand

Corporation which found that a representative sample of California state
prisoners who had been convicted for robbery offenses at some point in the
past would have committed large numbers of robberies and burglaries in the
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likelihood of recidivism into the statute was meant to reduce the
need for judges to sentence on a case-by-case basis.4 5
During early hearings on the bill, a testifying researcher
discussed eight factors to identify offenders with higher rates of
offending. 46 A record of prior convictions for robbery or burglary
was just one of the eight factors. Leading criminologists have
criticized the attempt to apply recidivism research to an inflexible
decision-making process because even when multiple factors are
considered, such predictive modeling is nonetheless prone to
substantial error rates. 47 Perhaps most importantly, for the
purposes of this Article, the researcher also noted that the total
number of convictions is unrelated to the rate of offending: "The
fact that someone is being prosecuted for multiple counts does not
have anything to do with the rate of offending. Typically it has to
do with one criminal episode rather than a long string of crimes." 48
2.

The 1988 Petty Amendment

In 1988, Congress amended ACCA to specify that the three
predicate convictions must be for offenses "committed on occasions
different from one another." 49 The statute was amended in
response to United States v. Petty,50 a case in which the defendant
year prior to their most recent incarceration); see also CCLSA Hearings, supra
note 19, at 98 (statement of Peter Greenwood, Senior Researcher, The Rand
Corp., Santa Monica, Cal.) ("The characteristics which identify high-rate
burglars and robbers include obviously those who are convicted for robbery
and burglary. Offenders convicted of other crimes against the person . . . on
the average commit robberies and burglaries at a much lower rate than those
convicted of those crimes.").
45. In applying ACCA, judges are instructed to look only at the record of
prior convictions: the type of offenses and the occasions on which those
offenses occurred. See Taylor, 595 U.S. at 602 ("We think the only plausible
interpretation of [ACCA] is that . .. it generally requires the trial court to look
only to the fact of conviction . . . ."). See also James E. Hooper, Note, Bright

Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal
Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1962 (1991) (discussing how ACCA was designed
to limit judicial discretion by relying on the record of conviction).
46. CCLSA Hearings,supra note 19, at 98.
47. See Hooper, supra note 45, at 1962-63. Hooper notes that attempts to
predict future criminality consider "several factors in addition to the number
and type of prior offenses-age and socioeconomic status, for example-that
tend to predict recidivism." And even in these "broad, multifactor" analyses,
"[elrror rates . . . can be quite substantial; even the better models achieve only
seventy percent accuracy." Id. (citing JOAN R. PETERSILIA AND SuSAN TURNER,
GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL MINORITIES 26

(1985)). ACCA does not even attempt to incorporate multiple factors; instead
the statute "classifies criminals based on a much narrower set of factsnumber, type, and timing of prior convictions." Id.
48. CCLSA Hearings,supra note 19, at 98.
49. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402
(amending the language of the Armed Career Criminal Act).
50. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Petty
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was sentenced under ACCA based on a six-count robbery
conviction resulting from the hold-up of six patrons of a single
restaurant. On petition for a writ of certiorari in Petty, the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, admitted the
government's erroneous application of the statute.5 1 The Solicitor
General's brief acknowledged that, although ACCA lacked the
descriptive language found in other recidivist statutes requiring
that predicate convictions be for "offenses committed on occasions
different from one another," the legislative history made clear that
such an interpretation was intended.52 Based on a review of the
legislative history, the brief concluded that the offenses underlying
the prior convictions must be "multiple criminal episodes" that are
"distinct in time."53 The Supreme Court reversed Petty and
remanded for consideration in light of the Solicitor General's
brief.54 On remand, the Eighth Circuit overturned Petty's
conviction, agreeing with the Solicitor General that the statute
"was intended to reach multiple criminal episodes that were
distinct in time, not multiple felony convictions arising out of a
single criminal episode."55
Congress responded by amending the statute to reflect the
Solicitor General's interpretation. Senator Joseph Biden, former
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, included a statement
explaining the amendment:
[The amendment] clarifies the armed career criminal statute ... by
inserting language describing the requisite type of prior convictions
that trigger the law's mandatory minimum sentencing provisions...
. Under the amendment, the three previous convictions would have
to be for offenses "committed occasions different from one another."
Thus, a single multi-count conviction could still qualify where the
counts related to crimes committed on different occasions, but a
robbery of multiple victims simultaneously (as in Petty) would count
as only one conviction. This interpretation plainly expresses that
concept of what is meant by a "career criminal," that is, a person
who over the course of time commits three

or more of the

enumerated kinds of felonies and is convicted therefor. It is

51. United States v. Petty, 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Petty Il]

(noting, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, that the Solicitor General
admitted error in applying an ACCA enhancement to Mr. Petty).
52. Id. ("[The Solicitor General] noted that the legislative history strongly
supports the conclusion that the statute was intended to reach multiple
criminal episodes that were distinct in time, not multiple felony convictions
arising out of a single criminal episode."). See also McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1020
(explaining the Solicitor General's position that neither Congress nor the
United States Department of Justice intended the penalty provision of ACCA
to apply more broadly than other federal recidivist statutes).
53. Id.
54. Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
55. Petty II, 828 F.2d at 2.
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appropriate to clarify the statute in this regard, both to avoid future
litigation and to insure that its rigorous sentencing provisions apply
only as intended in cases meriting such strict punishment. 6
Experience would prove that the 1988 Petty amendment
clarified only that criminal acts occurring "simultaneously" (as in
the Petty case itself) would no longer count as more than one
predicate offense. The vague phrase "over the course of time"
would be interpreted to include a period as short as half an hour,
as long as one criminal act could be considered complete before the
next one began.57

B. Overinclusive Statutory Provisions
ACCA's reach has been expanded over the past two decades
well beyond those serious repeat offenders initially targeted by
Congress. Individuals sentenced under ACCA include those who
have never served prison time and those with no violent criminal
history.5 8 Several factors account for ACCA's overly expansive
application. In the first place, the conduct triggering its
application is frequently neither a violent felony nor a serious drug
offense, since the federal felon-in-possession statute is essentially
a status offense.59 Applying the penalty provision to mere firearm
possession, ACCA strays from the original idea of targeting
offenders who repeatedly use firearms during the commission of a
robbery or burglary.6 0
In addition, a wide range of offenses qualify as violent
56. 134 CONG. REC. S17, 360 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Joseph Biden) (emphasis added).
57. See infra Part III.B.
58. Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 53.
59. In many cases, years and even decades after committing offenses that
qualify as ACCA predicates, mere gun possession triggers application of the
statute. See, for example, United States v. Jemison, 292 F. App'x 863 (4th Cir.
2008), in which Mr. Jemison was convicted of illegally possessing a firearm
that was found on the floorboard of his car after he crashed. Two successive
cocaine distribution transactions over a twenty-four hour period nearly twenty
years earlier counted toward his three predicate offenses. See also Ziotnick,
supra note 9, at 52 (noting that "[mlany cases brought in federal court during
the pre-Booker period under [ACCA] involved simple gun possession, meaning
that the facts did not indicate that the defendant was engaged in any other
criminal conduct at the time.").
60. That simple possession can trigger a mandatory fifteen year sentence is
particularly noteworthy given that an individual's right to bear arms is a
constitutional right. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The
life-time ban on gun possession for people with virtually any prior felony
convictions has been criticized as overly harsh and not so firmly rooted in
American legal history. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart
Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695 (2009). However, challenges to
the lifetime ban under Heller have failed. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593
F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60070 (E.D. Wis. July 23, 2008).
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felonies;6 1 no prior conviction is too dated to qualify as a
predicate; 62 drug predicates need not be genuinely serious drug
offenses; 63 and, finally, the focus of this Article: the different
occasions provision has produced an artificially expanded
definition of a criminal career. 64
Judicial interpretation of the different occasions provisions
has been a particularly troublesome contributor to ACCA's broad
scope largely because it can be satisfied by conduct charged in a
single indictment.65 Individuals who break into one building and
rob three different businesses are eligible for the fifteen-year
ACCA enhancement;66 as are those who make three different drug
61. See, e.g., Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 52-53 ("[ACCA] makes simple
burglary a 'crime of violence' . . . [and] [uinder many state codes, an unarmed
break-in of unoccupied dwellings constitutes burglary and therefore qualifies
as a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA.") (citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., Jemison, 292 F. App'x at 863 (concluding that two successive
cocaine distribution transactions over a twenty-four hour period nearly twenty
years earlier count as two prior offenses); United States v. Hobbs, 136 F.3d
384 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that four prior robberies occurring over a few
consecutive days nearly twenty years earlier count as ACCA predicates);
United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 687 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that two
burglaries committed on the same day more than twenty years earlier count
as ACCA predicates); United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654 (holding that a
conviction for burglary nearly forty years earlier counts as an ACCA
predicate); United States v. Gautier, 590 F. Supp. 2d 214, 219 (D. Mass. 2008)
(concluding that two prior armed robberies committed ten years earlier when
defendant was sixteen years old count as ACCA predicates).
63. For purposes of ACCA, serious drug felonies are those offenses that
carry a maximum term of ten years imprisonment. However, recidivist
enhancements that increase the maximum term of imprisonment are fair
game. For example, a drug offense that carries a maximum sentence of less
than ten years but warrants a term of ten years or more when applied to a
recidivist counts as an ACCA predicate. See Ethan Davis, Comment, The
Sentence Imposed Versus the Statutory Maximum: Repairing the Armed Career
Criminal Act, 118 YALE L.J. 369 (2008). In addition, many relatively minor
state drug offenses include a maximum of at least ten years depending on the
drug involved. See Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 53 ("[Mlost state drug statutes
provide at least a ten-year maximum for the distribution or possession with
intent to distribute of any amount of cocaine, heroin, or other serious drugs.
Thus, petty offenders, especially drug addicts desperate for a 'fix,' could easily
amass the requisite three convictions to qualify for the fifteen-year mandatory,
simply by selling small amounts of drugs. . . .") (citations omitted).
64. See, e.g., Jemison, 292 F. App'x at 863 (finding that two successive
cocaine distribution transactions over a twenty-four hour period count as two
prior convictions); United States v. Washington, 898 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding that two robberies of the same store clerk committed a few hours
apart are separate occasions under ACCA); United States v. Letterlough, 63
F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that two sales of a single crack cocaine dose
to the same police officer within ninety minutes are two separate convictions
under ACCA).

65. See infra Part IV.
66. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1015; United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095
(10th Cir. 1990).
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deals in one hour.67 Compared with other habitual offender
statutes, ACCA's different occasions provision is particularly
broad. For example, the federal three-strikes statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559(c), requires that "each [offense] used as a basis for
sentencing . .. [be] committed after the defendant's conviction of
the preceding [offensel." 6 8 Unlike ACCA, the federal three-strikes
statute was carefully drafted to specify that each prior offense be
separated by an intervening conviction. Similarly, many states
whose codes include habitual offender provisions require an
intervening conviction between each prior offense.69 As a result of
how prior convictions are counted under ACCA-and the relatively
minor offenses that can qualify as ACCA predicates-some of the
"career criminals" sentenced under the statute have never served
time in prison for their prior offenses. David Zlotnick offers an
example:
A troubled and alcoholic youth, [Jimmy Sluder] received probation
for three unarmed burglaries early in his life. After completing his
probation, he was arrested several years later for possession of an
unlicensed firearm. Although the state court saw fit to give him only
a thirty-day suspended sentence, the federal government prosecuted
him under the ACCA, and he received a fifteen-year sentence in
federal prison despite never having served any time in state
prison. 70

C. "Committed on Occasions Different" JudicialDevelopment of
an Overinclusive and Arbitrary Standard
After the Petty amendment, there were several directions the
courts could have taken to determine the occasions on which prior
offenses occurred. They could have interpreted the amendment to
include an intervening conviction requirement.7 1 They could have
applied a case-by-case approach that considers the goals of the
statute to target "hard core" repeat offenders. Or, they could have
interpreted the amendment to exclude from ACCA's reach only
those cases with a particular Petty-like factual scenario. In the
absence of a clear intervening conviction requirement to guide
them, appellate courts chose the latter course, adopting a rigid
67. See, e.g., Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 332, 337 (two drug deals over course of
hour not continuous course of conduct).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
69. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-501-504 (2009); ALA. CODE ANN. § 13A5-9,-10 (2000); CAL. PEN. CODE § 667 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-801
(2004); DEL. CODE § 4214 (2011). But see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016(3)

(1999) (defining a "persistent offender" as "one who has pleaded guilty to or
has been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times")
(emphasis added).
70. Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 53 n.178.
71. This approach was indeed advanced by the Third Circuit early on but
has since been abandoned. See infra Part III.A.
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standard that treats criminal acts as "different" from one another
unless they occur virtually simultaneously. 72 And because it is
usually impossible to commit multiple offenses simultaneously, 73
the standard that has developed over the past twenty years is one
to which Petty-like facts may present the only reliable exception. 74
As they have interpreted the statute, courts define different
occasions as "separate and distinct criminal episodes" 75 that have
a discernable beginning and end after which the defendant had an
opportunity to refrain from committing the next offense.7 6 Labored
language is often used to articulate these separate criminal
episodes. For example, the First Circuit describes separate
criminal episodes as involving "a time interval during which the
defendant successfully has completed his first crime, safely
escaped, and which affords defendant a 'breather,' viz., a period
(however brief) which is devoid of criminal activity and in which
he may contemplate whether or not to commit a second crime."7 7
This is distinguished from "a time lapse which does not mark the
endpoint of the first crime, but merely the natural consequence of

72. "Seemingly, the courts have allowed a defendant to be subject to the
ACCA in every situation except where there is a true 'simultaneous' criminal
episode." United States v. Brady, 988 F.2d 664, 674 (6th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
73. Unless, of course, a single act results in the violation of multiple
statutes. The Hudspeth Court compared the Petty-like scenario, in which "the
crime is completed with the single utterance of 'stick 'em up,"' with "an
individual who violates multiple criminal statutes by a single act." Hudspeth,
42 F.3d at 1021.
74. Indeed, as Judge Flaum noted in his Hudspeth dissent, "the import of
the post-Petty amendment to the ACCA is that Congress has spoken clearly to
a particular factual scenario (several robberies accomplished by the same
'stick-em-up')." Id. at 1026 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
75. Hobbs, 136 F.3d at 388.
76. See Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 334 ("[A] common sense definition tells us
that Congress intended to include within the scope of the ACCA only those
predicate offenses that can be isolated with a beginning and an end-ones that
constitute an occurrence unto themselves."); United States v. James, 337 F.3d
387, 391 (2003) (finding two prior burglaries were separate and distinct
criminal episodes because "[t]he first burglary was completed before the
second started . . . ."); Pope, 132 F.3d at 692 ("The successful completion of one

crime plus a subsequent conscious decision to commit another crime makes
that second crime distinct from the first for the purposes of the ACCA.");
United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that Hill
committed two separate burglaries in one night because, among other things,
"it [was] possible to discern the point at which the first offense [was]
completed, and the subsequent point at which the second offense [began].").
77. United States v. Stearns, 387 F.3d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 2004). See also
Washington, 898 F.2d at 442 (The defendant's "two robberies were separate
criminal episodes because he committed the first, completed it, and escaped;
then, after a few hours of no criminal activity, Washington returned to commit
the second crime.").
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a continuous course of extended criminal conduct."78 The Sixth
Circuit has developed a similarly strained definition of a distinct
episode: "an incident that is part of a series, but forms a separate
unit within the whole. Although related to the entire course of
events, an episode is a punctuated occurrence with a limited
duration."79
Additional factors incorporated into the analysis of separate
and distinct episodes include the geographic location, number of
victims, nature of the offenses, method of completion, motive, and
time interval between offenses.80 None of these factors is
necessarily determinative on its own, unless "any one of the
factors has a strong presence," in which case one or two factors
"can dispositively segregate an extended criminal enterprise into a
series of separate and distinct episodes."8' Despite the relevance of
time in the common understanding of an occasion, all circuits
agree that the time interval between offenses is not dispositive."
Mere temporal proximity" does not "merge multiple offenses into a
single criminal episode."82 Even if "the pause between the two
offenses [is] brief . .. crimes committed in rapid succession are still
committed on different occasions when they 'reflect distinct
aggressions."' 8' With no temporal requirement, criminal careers
can begin and end in the space of less than an hour.84 Often
without giving much thought to the statute's purpose, courts recite
various combinations of the language above to conclude that prior
offenses occurred on different occasions. As one judge has noted,
"[t]he courts have become masterful in using phrases and concepts
such as the acts committed by the defendant were distinct in time,
the defendant had successfully completed the first crime and was
78. Id.
79. United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1209 (1st Cir. 1997).
80. See, e.g., Stearns, 387 F.3d at 108 ("The 'occasions' inquiry conceivably
may turn upon any combination of circumstances, including (but not limited
to) the identity of the victim; the type of crime; the time interval between the
crimes; the location of the crimes; the continuity velnon of the defendant's
conduct; and/or the apparent motive for the crimes."); United States v. Leeson,
453 F.3d 631, 640-41 (applying the Letterlough factors); Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at
1023 ("Hudspeth committed three separate crimes, at three separate times,
against three separate victims, in three separate locations."); United States v.
Mucha, 49 F. App'x 368, 371 (3rd Cir. 2002) ("Though three of the crimes
occurred on the same night, they were each committed in different towns
against different victims. As such, Mucha had opportunities to cease and
desist from further criminal activity.").
81. Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 336.
82. United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Pope, 132 F.3d at 690).
83. United States v. Davidson, 527 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2008).
84. See, e.g., Hobbs, 136 F.3d at 384 (holding that multiple prior convictions
for offenses that occurred in less than one hour count as ACCA predicates);
Brady, 988 F.2d at 669 (same); Washington, 898. F.2d at 439 (same); United
States v. Antonie, 953 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
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free to leave . . . to explain why the case before them" does not

represent simultaneous acts.8 5
The rigid standard that has emerged not only turns one night
into a career; it produces different outcomes in factually similar
scenarios. The divergent outcomes in McElyea and Hudspeth
discussed in the Introduction are only one example of ACCA's
inconsistency.
Compare United States v. Murphy with United States v.
Tisdale. In Tisdale, another shopping mall case, the ACCA
sentence was upheld where the defendant broke into a shopping
mall and burglarized three different businesses. The court found
that each burglary constituted a separate crime because "[a]fter
the defendant 'successfully completed' burglarizing one business,
he was free to leave. The fact that he chose, instead, to burglarize
another business is evidence of his intent to engage in a separate
criminal episode."8 6 The Tisdale court acknowledged that it is
impossible to burglarize three separate businesses simultaneously,
as the defendant tried to argue based on Petty. The fact that the
burglaries took place in one "structure" did not persuade the court
that these burglaries were committed at the same location.87
Factual scenarios like Hudspeth and Tisdale are common.88
In Murphy, however, the First Circuit refused to apply an
ACCA enhancement where the defendant and an accomplice broke
into an apartment complex and burgled two residences next door
to one another. While Murphy remained in the first residence to
prevent the occupant from calling the police, one of his accomplices
kicked in the door of the adjacent apartment and robbed the
second victim.89 The First Circuit rejected an ACCA enhancement
because "there exists no principled way of distinguishing between
the end of the first burglary and the beginning of the second."9 0
"Because he never left the first location, he did not 'successfully
complete' the first burglary until his accomplices completed the
second."9 ' Murphy could have faced an ACCA enhancement under
the reasoning in Hudspeth and Tisdale, given that two separate
85. Brady, 988 F.2d at 674 (Jones, J., dissenting).
86. Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1099.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Antonie, 953 F.2d at 498 (holding that two armed robberies of
two different stores in less than an hour are separate predicate offenses);
Mucha, 49 F. App'x at 371 (finding that three burglaries on the same night are
separate ACCA predicates because "they were each committed in different
towns against different victims."); United States v. Carr, No. 2:06-CR-14-FL-1,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83941 (E.D.N.C. 2008) ("breaking and entering
multiple subunits at a single [storage unit] complex constitute separate
occasions.").
89. Murphy, 107 F.3d at 1208.
90. Id. at 1210.
91. Id.
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residences and two separate victims were burgled and Murphy
was legally responsible for both burglaries.9 2
Consider also the following cases involving criminal conduct
occurring during an escape. In United States v. Schieman, the
Seventh Circuit upheld an ACCA enhancement where the
defendant had completed one burglary and "safely escaped" from
the premises at the time he assaulted a police officer who followed
him down the street. 93 In United States v. Graves, when the
defendant burgled a home and assaulted a police officer in the
woods outside the home, the burglary and assault were held to be
part of the same criminal episode because the defendant had not
left the location of the first crime when he assaulted the officer.9 4
In Davidson, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the inconsistent
results across circuits arising from the problem of "whether to
treat as separate occasions . . . the commission of an offense
designed to elude apprehension for an underlying offense . . . and .

. . the commission of the underlying offense."9 5 While driving,
Davidson assaulted his girlfriend who was a passenger in his car.96
When stopped by a deputy sheriff who asked him to step out of the
vehicle, Davidson sped away.9 7 The court ultimately concluded
that Davidson's offenses of attempted domestic assault on his
girlfriend and resisting arrest by fleeing were committed on
different occasions. 98 The court reasoned that "when the deputy
sheriff stopped Davidson's vehicle . . . Davidson's attempted
assault on his girlfriend . . . had concluded, and the traffic stop

represented a discernible pause in activity during which Davidson
had an opportunity to cease and desist from further criminal
activity."9 9 The court distinguished Graves, concluding that the
traffic stop presented a "moment of relative calm" not present in

92. In a case similar to Murphy, the Fourth Circuit held that there was not
enough information in the record to conclude that a defendant's burglaries of
two storage units occurred on separate occasions because it was unclear
whether the defendant had entered both storage units himself sequentially or
"simultaneously with the aid of his accomplice." United States v. Tucker, 603
F.3d 260, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2010).
93. United States v. Schieman, 894 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1990). In
dissent, Judge Ripple argued that the defendant's crimes were committed on
the same occasion because "a burglary and the immediate escape" are "part of
the same operation or episode" where one is the "continuation of the other." Id.
at 915 (Ripple, J., dissenting). Judge Ripple argued that the standard for
determining separateness should be more "rigorous" than the majority had
treated it. Id.
94. United States v. Graves, 60 F.3d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995).
95. Davidson, 527 F.3d at 708.
96. Id. at 707.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 710.
99. Id.
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Graves.10 0
Left with little guidance after Petty, the courts of appeal have
developed a standard that reflects the most restrictive
interpretation of Congress's attempt to clarify the statute. As the
dissent in Hudspeth observed, resolution of the occasions inquiry
involves less a case-by-case determination of separateness and
more a rigid application of pre-determined factors:
The majority concludes that Hudspeth ought to receive the ACCA
enhancement on the basis of his three distinct aggressions against
three separate victims in three separate locations. This approach
has the apparent virtue of drawing a bright-line (between
simultaneous and sequential crimes) . . . though I believe its

mechanical application would lead to just as many, if not more,
arbitrary results as a case-by-case approach would produce.101
The dissent went on to illustrate the arbitrary nature of the
court's analysis:
The majority appears to admit that the assailant who enters an
apartment with an automatic weapon and shoots several people
with one burst of his weapon is not subject to the provisions of this
statute. On the other hand, if he takes several steps around the
room divider and shoots several others, the statute becomes
operative because, at least in some metaphysical sense, he had time
to think about the second pull of the trigger. The crimes above no
doubt deserve severe punishment. However, it is difficult to see, and
Congress certainly did not intend, that one, but not the other,
individual be treated as a recidivist. 102
All that remains clear after Petty is that an intervening
conviction between offenses is not required, and the simultaneous
robbery of six restaurant patrons is to be counted as a single
occasion.103

100. Id.
101. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1026 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1037 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
103. See Brady, 988 F.2d at 674 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("Congress did not
explicitly instruct the courts on how to deal with the large, undefined, murky
middle ground that rests between Balascsak and Petty . . . ."). In a concurring
opinion rejecting an ACCA enhancement, Judge Clay of the Sixth Circuit
suggested that the different occasions provision may make the statute
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 316,
323 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J., concurring). In Judge Clay's view, "the case law
fails to provide the requisite guidance to resolve the case and permit us to
determine the outcome." Id. at 322. "In attempting to remove the ambiguity,
case law interpreting the language 'committed on occasions different from one
another' has led to inconsistent outcomes in our Court as well as other

Circuits." Id. "[W]ere it not for the rule of lenity, it is possible that this
thoroughly ambiguous statute could be declared unconstitutional on the

ground that it is void for vagueness." Id. at 323.

2011]

981

One Day CriminalCareers

III. EFFORTS To LIMIT ACCA's REACH
Almost as soon as it was enacted, ACCA was widely criticized
for its overinclusive application, particularly relating to how prior
convictions are counted as predicates. 104 Early attempts to
consider the purpose of the statute rejected the notion that a onenight crime spree could amount to multiple criminal episodes. For
example, finding that four prior convictions for kidnapping and
assault committed on two separate days, "arose out of two, not
three, distinct criminal episodes," the Second Circuit in United
States v. Towne 05 noted: "It seems quite clear that [ACCA] was

intended to target recidivists, i.e., those who have engaged in
violent criminal activity on at least three separate occasions, and
not individuals who happen to acquire three convictions as a result
of a single criminal episode. . . ." In rejecting the ACCA

enhancement in McElyea, the Ninth Circuit found that a
defendant who "committed two identical crimes in basically the
same location within a short time period .

.

. does not meet the

profile of a career criminal envisioned by Congress." 0 6 A few years
after Petty was decided, a panel of the Sixth Circuit rejected an
ACCA enhancement, finding that "Congress sought to target
career criminals with this statute, and we cannot agree with our
sister circuits that a career logically comprises the events of a
single evening." 07 The Sixth Circuit ultimately reversed this
judgment in a rehearing en banc. The court upheld the ACCA
enhancement after applying the familiar set of factors: "[The
defendant] committed crimes against different victims at different
places and at distinctly different times."108 Despite these few early
attempts, the courts of appeal have come to agree that the statute
does not exclude individuals with one-night criminal careers.
Proposals to address the overbreadth of the different
occasions inquiry generally fall into two categories: (1) use an

104. Critics have cited many issues with the ACCA's breadth, including: (1)
mere possession as the triggering offense, e.g., Steven R. Sady, The Armed
Career CriminalAct - What's Wrong with "Three Strikes, You're Out?," 7 FED.
SENT. R. 69 (1994); Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 52-54; (2) the broad definition of
violent felony, e.g., Hillier, supra note 14, at 78; Levine, supra note 14, at 537;
Zlotnick, supra note 9, at 1, 52-53; (3) the absence of any time limits on
qualifying prior convictions, e.g., Sady, supra note 104, at 69; Levine, supra
note 14, at 537; (4) the use of recidivist enhancements to count toward
statutory maximum sentence requirements for prior qualifying drug crimes,
e.g., Davis, supra note 63, at 369, 375; and (5) the confusion over how to define
separate occasions, e.g., Hooper, supra note 45, at 1951, 1957; Derrick D.
Crago, Note, The Problem of Counting to Three Under the Armed Career
CriminalAct, 41 CASE W. RES. 1179 (1991).
105. United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 891 (2d Cir. 1989).
106. McElyea, 158 F. 3d at 1021.
107. United States v. Brady, 960 F.2d 35, 40 (6th Cir. 1992).
108. Brady, 988 F.2d at 669.
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intervening convictions approach; or (2) model ACCA on the career
offender provision of the federal sentencing guidelines.
A. The Intervening ConvictionsApproach
In its 1989 en banc decision in United States v. Balascsak,109
the Third Circuit interpreted the Petty Amendment to require an
intervening conviction between prior qualifying offenses. The court
reversed the ACCA application in a case in which two of the three
predicate offenses involved two burglaries committed sometime
between 10:45 PM on July 10, 1981, and 7:00 AM the next day.
Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority, was concerned that
"committed on occasions different from one another" was a
"malleable standard[] . . . . susceptible of applications inconsistent
with the congressional purpose."110 In searching for "small
temporal distinctions," courts would neglect to consider "the
underlying purpose of the statute.""' The majority concluded that
"[w]e could hardly attribute to Congress the intention of branding
someone a career criminal offender who, for example, committed
several separate felonies during a single drunken spree, with no
time to sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents."11 2
Congress must have intended to require an intervening conviction
between each previous offense, Judge Gibbons reasoned, because
this is the only practical way to avoid the "cumbersome procedure
[ofj taking evidence and evaluating the precise temporal, spatial,
or jurisprudential relationship between two crimes." 113 Balascsak
was soon overruled, however, and the Third Circuit joined the
remaining circuits in rejecting the intervening convictions
approach. 114
Supporters of the intervening convictions approach argue that
this requirement best realizes Congress's intent to target those
who have had a chance to be rehabilitated in prison but have gone
on to commit additional crimes after release.115 Such a

109. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 683.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 683.
113. Id. at 684. Concurring, Judge Becker disagreed with the intervening
conviction approach, but thought the government should be required to prove
a degree of temporal separateness between criminal acts. Id. at 685 (Becker,
J., concurring).
114. See United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 73-74 (1989) (overruling
the intervening conviction approach endorsed by Balascsak because other
courts of appeal "have held that the individual convictions may be counted for
purposes of sentencing enhancement so long as the criminal episodes
underlying the convictions were distinct in time" and because "the statute does
not require that the three predicate offenses be separated by intervening
convictions.").
115. See Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 682 (citing Assistant Attorney General
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requirement is incorporated in most state habitual offender
statutes. 116 However, settled consensus among the courts
acknowledges that if Congress had intended ACCA predicates to
be separated by intervening convictions, it would have drafted the
statute accordingly, as it has done with other recidivist statutes." 7
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clarified that in the absence of
clear statutory language requiring an intervening conviction
between offenses, a conviction need not include both an
adjudication of guilt and a sentence.1 18 In Deal v. United States,119
the Court held that a conviction for purposes of stacking
mandatory minimums under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) "refers to the
finding of guilt by a judge or jury that necessarily precedes the
entry of a final judgment of conviction."120 The Court's approach to
statutory construction in Deal supports a conclusion that a
defendant who is convicted of three counts of burglary arising out
of conduct in a single evening, and who receives a single sentence
imposed on one day, has three separate convictions for purposes of
ACCA.
B. The Career Offender Sentencing Guidelines as a Model
for ACCA
Scholars have suggested that ACCA be modeled on the career
offender provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 121 Both
Trott's statement at the Congressional hearings on ACCA, where he described
career criminals as those "people who have demonstrated . . . that locking
them up and letting them go doesn't do any good."); Crago, supra note 104, at
1194-95. Crago argues that because the original bill was a three strikes bill
and the final bill was only meant to address federalism concerns by triggering
the statute's application with a violation of 922(g)(1), "at an absolute
minimum, two convictions should be in place before commission of the crime
underlying the third required conviction." Id. at 1193. In other words, Thomas
Hudspeth's three convictions for burglarizing three stores in one half hour
should count, at most, as two ACCA predicates. Jim Levine argues for an
intervening arrest between predicate offenses. Levine, supra note 14, at 540.
116. See supra text accompanying note 69.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) ("[A] person who is convicted in
a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment if the person has been convicted . . . of two or more serious
violent felonies; or one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious
drug offenses; and each [offense] used as a basis for sentencing under this
subsection, other than the first, was committed after the defendant's conviction
of the preceding [offense].") (emphasis added).
118. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., Hooper, supra note 45, at 1986 (proposing that the Guidelines
concept of a criminal occasion be applied to ACCA); Sady, supra note 104, at
69 (arguing that the Guidelines' treatment of priors and the option to depart
for mitigating circumstances offers a "more rational" approach than "ACCA's
blind rigor"); Levine, supra note 14 (proposing that ACCA be amended to be
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ACCA and the career offender guideline target the same type of
repeat offender and both were enacted in the same bill. The
United States Sentencing Guidelines, which went into effect in
1987, include a provision for sentencing "career offenders." Under
the Guidelines,
[a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant
offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 122
Before 2007, the career offender guideline had a test similar
to ACCA for counting predicate offenses. The guideline provided
that "[p]rior sentences imposed in relatedcases are to be treated as
one sentence" for purposes of assigning criminal history points.123
The commentary to the Guidelines directed courts to treat cases as
related "if they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the
same occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or
(3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing."124 Under the pre2007 Guidelines, courts used factors similar to those used in
ACCA cases to define whether offenses occurred on separate
occasions.125

The career offender guideline was amended in 2007 to
address confusion in determining relatedness of prior sentences
and whether to count them separately or together for purposes of
the career offender enhancement. 126 The United States Sentencing

consistent with the Guidelines approach to calculating criminal history).
122. United States Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. Appx. § 4B1.1 (West
2011).
123. See U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING

at
available
2007),
(May
11,
89-90
GUIDELINES
http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/ReaderFriendly/20070501-RFAmend
Amend.pdf (referencing the pre-amendment Definitions and Instructions for
Computing Criminal History, Section 4A1.2(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 92 (referencing the pre-amendment commentary to Section
4A1.2, cmt. 3).
125. United States v. Moreno-Arredondo, 255 F.3d 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Even though the two offenses were not committed simultaneously (but they
almost were) and were not committed against the same victim (but the victims
were closely related to each other and had a relationship with the defendant),
they were the identical offense, were committed at the identical geographic
location, and were barely separated in time literally by a matter of minutes.").
126. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg.
28,558, 28,575 (May 21, 2007) ("The Commission has heard from a number of
practitioners throughout the criminal justice system that the 'related cases'
rules . . . are too complex and lead to confusion. Moreover, a significant
amount of litigation has arisen concerning application of the rules, and circuit
conflicts have developed over the meaning of terms in the commentary that
define when prior sentences may be considered 'related."').
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Commission responded to input from federal judges, prosecutors,
defense counsel, probation officers, and academics who were
concerned with the instructions for determining prior related
sentences. 127 The amended guideline states that convictions not
separated by an intervening arrest are "counted separately unless
(A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same
charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the
same day."128 To determine the applicability of the career offender
guideline, courts are no longer faced with questions of whether
prior sentences were related and occurred on the same occasion.
They must simply determine whether prior sentences not
separated by an intervening arrest were for offenses contained in
the same charging instrument or were imposed on the same day.129
Recognizing that this simplified approach to counting prior
offenses may understate the seriousness of a particular offender's
criminal history, the Commission noted that courts may increase
criminal history points for prior crimes of violence,130 and they
may depart upward from the guideline range. 13 Courts may also
127. 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558.
128. 18 U.S.C.A. Appx. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (West 2011).
129. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. at
28,576. "Under the amendment, the initial inquiry will be whether the prior
sentences were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e.,
the defendant was arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second
offense). If so, they are to be considered separate sentences, counted
separately, and no further inquiry is required. If the prior sentences were for
offenses that were not separated by an intervening arrest, the sentences are to
be counted as separate sentences unless the sentences (1) were for offenses
that were named in the same charging document, or (2) were imposed on the
same day. In either of these situations they are treated as a single sentence.").
Id.
130. See id. at 28,558, 28,575 ("[I]f a defendant's criminal history contains
two robbery convictions for which the defendant received concurrent five-year
sentences of imprisonment and the sentences are considered a single sentence
because the offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest and were
imposed on the same day, a total of 3 points would be added under § 4A1. 1(a).
An additional point would be added under § 4A1.1(f) because the second
sentence was for a crime of violence . . . .").
131. See United States Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 4A1.2,
n.3 (West 2011).
Counting multiple prior sentences as a single sentence may result in a
criminal history score that underrepresents the seriousness of the
defendant's criminal history and the danger that the defendant presents
to the public. In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted.
For example, if a defendant was convicted of a number of serious nonviolent offenses committed on different occasions, and the resulting
sentences were counted as a single sentence because either the
sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging
instrument or the defendant was sentenced for these offenses on the
same day, the assignment of a single set of points may not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the
frequency with which the defendant has committed crimes.
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depart downward from the guideline range in consideration of
sentencing goals laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).132 A recent case in
the Southern District of West Virginia illustrates an example of
the court's discretion in avoiding the career offender guideline:
Both offenses involved the distribution of small, user amounts of
drugs, and both offenses lack temporal proximity to either each
other or the present offense. In fact, the two prior offenses are each
over a decade old. . . .Mr. Moreland has not engaged in a "career" of
crime and has not subsisted on a criminal livelihood. He is a 34
year-old man who has made both good and bad decisions in his life.
He has not, however, demonstrated the pattern of recidivism or
violence that would justify disposal to prison for a period of 30 years
to life. One of the goals of sentencing remains the rehabilitation of
convicts. I find that Mr. Moreland has an excellent chance of turning
his life around after he completes his substantial sentence.133
Scholars have suggested that this type of straightforward rule
with built-in discretion mechanisms is necessary for a mandatory
minimum sentencing provision like ACCA.13 4 Like the career
offender guideline, ACCA offers the same sentence range
regardless of the severity of the crimes. However, as a mandatory
sentencing provision, ACCA leaves courts without the flexibility
that is built into the Guidelines.
Like the intervening conviction approach, the career offender
guidelines approach would involve statutory amendment.

Id.

132. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) (2011). Section 3553(a) provides, in part: "Factors to

be considered in imposing a sentence. . . . The court, in determining the

particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . ."Id.

133. United States v. Moreland, 568 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. W. Va. 2008).
As the district court noted in United States v. Carvajal, "Punishment should
not be more severe than that necessary to satisfy the goals of punishment."
No. 04 Cr. 222 (AKH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3076, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2005).
134. See, e.g., Hooper, supra note 45, at 1995-97 (arguing that some degree of
discretion when applying ACCA will produce outcomes more consistent with

the career offender guidelines and with congressional intent); Sady, supra note
104, at 71 (arguing that like the sentencing guidelines, ACCA should
incorporate "the availability of departure for extraordinary mitigating factors
[as] a safety valve for cases in which career offender treatment is irrationally
harsh"); Levine, supra note 14, at 556 (proposing that ACCA be amended to
incorporate the discretion for courts to consider "whether the offender had an
opportunity to be rehabilitated or deterred after committing each of the
felonies.").
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Congress has made no changes to the statute since 1988, but with
recent Supreme Court attention to ACCA's definition of violent
felony-and Justice Scalia's call to declare ACCA constitutionally
void-Congress may decide to intervene. Such an intervention
would present an opportunity to address the different occasions
provision as well the statute's residual clause.
IV.

SHEPARD AND THE SCOPE OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION

EXCEPTION
A more promising, if less direct, approach to limiting ACCA's
reach is suggested by two Supreme Court decisions restricting the
sources of information a sentencing court may consider in applying
ACCA. One of the most heavily litigated elements of ACCA is
whether a prior conviction meets the statute's definition of a
violent felony. 35 In Taylor v. United States,136 the Supreme Court
specified the general categorical rule that a sentencing court may
not examine the facts underlying a conviction for burglary to
determine whether it was a violent felony.8 7 However, in the
limited cases where a state's statutory definition of burglary is
broader than the definition of "generic burglary" under ACCA,138
Taylor outlined a modified categorical approach that permits a
sentencing court to consider the statutory elements, the charging
documents, and the jury instructions to determine whether the
prior conviction was for generic burglary.139
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court addressed the same
issue in the plea context. In Shepard,140 the defendant pled guilty
to four prior burglary convictions, but nothing in the record
indicated that the defendant had admitted to the generic element
of burglary that qualifies as an ACCA predicate. The government
attempted to introduce police reports to support the argument that
the defendant's guilty plea constituted an admission to generic
burglary.141 The Supreme Court rejected the use of police reports,
holding that a sentencing court may not consider facts about a
prior conviction unless those facts are based on judicial records of
"conclusive significance."14 2 Such records include the plea colloquy
135. See supra note 13.

136. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
137. Id. at 600.
138. For example, a state burglary statute that includes burglary of boats or
automobiles is broader than ACCA. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598-99
(interpreting the definition of burglary under ACCA to include the "generic,
contemporary meaning of burglary . .

.:

an unlawful or unprivileged entry

into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a
crime.").
139. Id. at 602.
140. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 13.
141. Id. at 17-18.
142. Id. at 25.
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between the defendant and the judge, a written plea agreement
presented to the court, or a "record of comparable findings of fact
adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea." 143 Information
in police reports lacks conclusive significance because such
information is not necessarily charged in an indictment and
admitted by a defendant, and it is usually information that is
unnecessary for a jury to convict.144 In both the plea and trial
contexts, the modified categorical approach "permits a court to
determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction
by consulting the trial record-including charging documents, plea
agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and
conclusions of law from a bench trial, and jury instructions and
verdict forms." 145
Shepard's holding has constitutional dimension. The source
restriction is meant, in part, to protect the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial by limiting the extent to which the court can use
prior convictions to increase the maximum penalty under 922(g). 4 6
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,147 the Supreme Court held that under
the Sixth Amendment, any fact that increases the maximum
penalty prescribed by statutel 48 must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the defendant in
a guilty plea.149 The one exception preserved by Apprendi is "the
fact of a prior conviction.""s0 A few years earlier in AlmendarezTorres v. United States,1s' the Supreme Court upheld against a
due process challenge the use of a prior conviction to enhance a
sentence, finding that recidivism is a "traditional, if not the most
traditional" basis for increasing a sentence. In applying the prior
conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment, the Apprendi Court
143. Id. at 20.
144. Id. at 16.
145. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1273.
146. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24. The maximum penalty for possession of a
firearm by a felon is ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).
147. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2001).
148. The statutory maximum is "the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Any facts
supporting a sentence that exceeds the maximum authorized by the facts
found by a jury or admitted by the defendant must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
149. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
150. Id. ("[O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
151. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).The
Court rejected Almendarez-Torres' due process argument holding that use of a
prior conviction is a sentencing enhancement, not an element of an offense,
and therefore need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 244-47.
Apprendi upheld the use of a prior conviction as an exception to the rule that
such facts must be submitted to a jury. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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reasoned that "the certainty that procedural safeguards attach[]to
any 'fact' of prior conviction . . . mitigate[s] the . . . Sixth
Amendment concerns."152

In determining the scope of a sentencing court's inquiry into a
prior conviction, Shepard distinguished the fact of a prior
conviction, which Apprendi said need not be proved, from facts
about a prior conviction, which must be based on reliable judicial
records.15 3 Rejecting the use of unreliable sources like police
reports, the Court reasoned that "allowing a broader evidentiary
enquiry" into facts about a prior conviction implicated the judicial
fact-finding proscribed by Apprendi by allowing the sentencing
court to make a disputed finding of fact about the prior conviction
that "is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior
judicial record." 154 In his Shepard concurrence, Justice Thomas
took the argument a step further, concluding that expanding the
evidentiary inquiry into facts about a prior conviction "would not
give rise to constitutional doubt ... [but] to constitutional error ...
"155

A. Shepard's Application to the Different Occasions Inquiry
Although Shepard addressed the definition of a violent felony
under ACCA, most circuits have extended its reach to the different
occasions inquiry.156 Most recently, in 2010, the Eleventh Circuit
152. Apprendi, 544 U.S. at 488.
153. The Shepard Court stated:
[Tihe Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee ... a jury's finding
of any disputed fact essential to increase the ceiling of a potential
sentence. While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a
prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of
a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones
and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge
to resolve the dispute. The rule of reading statutes to avoid serious risks
of unconstitutionality . . . counsels us to limit the scope of judicial
factfinding on the disputed generic character of a prior plea ....
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25-26.
At least one circuit has held that facts about an offense underlying a prior
conviction must be alleged in the indictment leading to that conviction. United
States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 841-43 (4th Cir. 2005).
154. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25. The Supreme Court has since questioned the
Almendarez-Torres exception, but only Justice Thomas has explicitly called for
overruling it. Id. at 27-28. Justice Thomas likewise questioned the
constitutional "firmity" of Shepard and Taylor, finding that these cases
"explain to lower courts how to conduct factfinding that is, according to the
logic of this Court's intervening precedents, unconstitutional in this very case."
Id. at 27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 28. Justice Thomas further suggested that Taylor's and Shepard's
decision to "explain to lower courts how to conduct factfinding' is
unconstitutional in light of Apprendi.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2005)
("ACCA's use of the term 'occasion' requires recourse only to data normally
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overruled its earlier decision in United States v. Richardson,15 7
which held that a sentencing court could consider police reports to
determine whether prior offenses occurred on separate
occasions.158 Noting the constitutional issues raised by the
intervening Apprendi and Shepard decisions, the court held that
"[b]ased on Shepard, there is simply no distinction left between
the scope of permissible evidence that can be used to determine if
the prior convictions are violent felonies or serious drug offenses or
if they were committed on different occasions . . . .".15
The result of Shepard's application in many cases has been a
rejection of an ACCA enhancement because the record of a prior
conviction is incomplete or based on unreliable sources. In Fuller,
for example, the Fifth Circuit reversed an ACCA enhancement
based on an absence in the record of "Shepard-approved material
that might resolve the question" of whether the prior burglaries
occurred on different occasions. 60 The defendant, Troy Fuller, had
been pulled over at a checkpoint and asked about his
citizenship.1'1 He evaded questioning and refused consent to
search his car. Eventually, Mr. Fuller's car was searched anyway
and border patrol agents found a loaded pistol under the front
passenger seat.162 It had been more than two decades since Mr.

found in conclusive judicial records, such as the date and location of an
offense, upon which Taylor and Shepard say we may rely."); United States v.
Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (recognizing that Shepard
applies to the different occasions inquiry); United States v. Williams, 223 F.
App'x 280, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Shepard to the different occasions
inquiry); United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006) (same);
United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 278-79 (5th Cir. 2005) (same); Sneed,
600 F.3d at 1326 (applying Shepard and overruling its earlier decision holding
that a sentencing court may look at police reports to determine whether prior
offenses were separate). The Eighth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that
does not apply the Shepard source restriction to the separate occasions
inquiry. See Davidson, 527 F.3d at 707 (relying on United States v. Boyles, 235
F.3d 1057, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000), which held that Taylor "do[es] not limit the
evidence a sentencing court may examine to decide whether earlier offenses
were committed on different occasions."). The First Circuit has not yet ruled
on the issue. See Gautier, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 230.
157. United States v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
158. Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1326. The Eleventh Circuit recently avoided the
application of Shepard. See United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th
Cir. 2009). In Canty, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a sentencing enhancement
under ACCA because the PSR did not include, and the government did not
request, any findings about whether the defendant's prior crimes of escape and
obstructing an officer were committed on different occasions. Id. at 1257. In
doing so, the court avoided the application of Shepard, refusing to overrule
Richardson.Id. at 1256.
159. Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332-33.
160. Fuller, 453 F.3d at 279-80.
161. Id. at 275.
162. Id.
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Fuller's convictions for two burglaries. 6 3 The Fifth Circuit found
no evidence in the judicial record that the prior burglaries
occurred "sequentially" rather than "simultaneously."6 4 Other
courts have reached a similar conclusion where the separateness
of prior convictions could not be established by Shepard-approved
facts.165
B. Refining Shepard's DistinctionBetween the Fact of a Prior
Conviction and Facts About a PriorConviction
Shepard has left unresolved the murky distinction between
the bare fact of a prior conviction and facts about a prior
conviction. Some defendants facing ACCA enhancements have
used Shepard to argue that the separate occasions inquiry itself
violates their Sixth Amendment rights even when such
determinations are made using so-called Shepard-approved
sources. Specifically, they argue that the separate occasions
inquiry involves facts about a prior conviction that must have been
alleged in the indictment on which the prior conviction is based or
pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.166 This argument has
failed to convince the appellate courts, some reasoning that the
date and time on which offenses were committed are inherent in
the fact of a conviction, 6 7 and some without engaging in much

163. Id. at 276.
164. Id. at 279-80.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Bookman, 197 F. App'x 349, 350 (5th Cir.
2006) (rejecting an ACCA enhancement where the separateness of predicate
offenses were not proven with Shepard-approved material); Gautier, 590 F.
Supp. 2d at 232 (applying Shepard to the occasions inquiry and rejecting the
ACCA enhancement because "the charging documents do not reveal the
location of the crimes, the time interval between the offenses, or the continuity
of the conduct.").
166. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 329 F. App'x 528, 529 (5th Cir. 2009)
("Garcia argues that his enhanced sentence under § 924(e) is unconstitutional
because his prior convictions and the dates of his prior convictions are
elements of the offense that were not alleged in the indictment, proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury, or admitted by him."); United States v. Michel,
446 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[The defendant] claims that . . . whether his
prior convictions were committed 'on occasions different from one another' is a
factual question that must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
not by the sentencing court.").
167. See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 282 (referring to the dates of prior
convictions as "essential components" of those prior convictions and finding
that "[a] conviction cannot ... be reduced to nothing more than that the
defendant was at some prior time convicted of some crime."); United States v.
Morris, 293 F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Morris presents no authority for
parsing out the recidivism inquiry" to exclude the occasions on which the
offenses occurred.); United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[W]e are not persuaded by the defendant's contention that the separateness
of the prior convictions can be distinguished from the mere fact of their
existence . . . .").
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analysis.168 There is at least one thoughtful discussion of this issue
that deserves a closer look.
In United States v. Thompson, 69 the defendant had been
convicted of numerous prior burglaries, none of which had been
alleged in the instant indictment.170 Thompson argued that
because the indictment had not included any of these prior
burglaries or the occasions on which they occurred, and because he
had not admitted to them, an ACCA enhancement violated his
Sixth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
whether the prior burglaries occurred on different occasions is a
fact "so inherent in a conviction that [it] need not be found by a
jury." 7 1 The court warned against applying an "artificially narrow
reading of the 'fact of a prior conviction' that would "sever the
prior conviction from its essential components."172
Thompson distinguished an earlier case, in which the Fourth
Circuit had reversed an ACCA enhancement because the
sentencing court relied on facts outside the indictment to
determine whether the prior burglary was a crime of violence
under ACCA. In Washington, the sentencing court relied on the
government's description of the building that the defendant
burgled and its "likely contents" and "identity of any occupants" to
conclude that the offense "involve[d] conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 173 This type of
fact-finding, Thompson held, was clearly different from
determining the occasion on which prior offenses occurred because
unlike separateness, characteristics of the burgled building are not
inherent in the fact of the prior conviction.174
168. See, e.g., United States v. Riggs, 302 F. App'x at 808-09 (10th Cir. 2008)
(summarily rejected the defendant's argument that in light of Shepard, "a jury
rather than a judge should have conducted the [different occasions] analysis");
Garcia, 329 F. App'x at 529 (stating simply that Garcia's "argument is
foreclosed by this court's jurisprudence.") (citing Apprendi and other cases);
Bookman, 263 F. App'x at 401 (holding that Almandarez-Torres forecloses the
argument that the occasions on which his prior offenses occurred must be
plead and proven beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Davis, 487 F.3d
282, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the Sixth Amendment argument based
on Apprendi without considering whether the occasions inquiry is or should be
distinct from the fact of prior conviction); United States v. Stotts, 346 F. App'x
356 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Under our precedent, a district court may properly
determine whether a defendant has three previous violent felony convictions
which occurred on separate occasions for purposes of applying the ACCA.").
169. United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2005).
170. Instead, Thompson's criminal history was included in the Presentence
Investigation Report. Id. at 280.
171. Id. at 282. "There is no occasion to persuade the jury, however, unless
there is a disputed question of fact extraneous to Thompson's prior
convictions. No such question exists here." Id. at 285.
172. Id.
173. Washington, 404 F.3d at 841.
174. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285-86.
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Judge Wilkins, dissenting, found nothing distinguishable
about these two types of judicial fact-finding. According to Judge
Wilkins, the court clearly violated Thompson's Sixth Amendment
rights when it enhanced his sentence based on findings of factthe dates on which the prior offenses were committed-that were
not alleged in the indictment or admitted by the defendant.175 To
avoid running afoul of the Sixth Amendment, Judge Wilkins
argued, the scope of the prior conviction exception should be
limited to those facts necessary for a conviction.17 6 As he noted:
"Although a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the question of
whether he committed a particular crime, in few, if any cases is a
jury required to find that the offense occurred on a particular
date."177 Because the date on which a crime was committed is
rarely an element of an offense, indictments are rarely required to
state the correct date on which a crime was committed.178
Echoing Justice Thomas's concurrence in Shepard, Judge
Wilkins was not persuaded that reliable judicial documents would
mitigate the Sixth Amendment significance. "[T]he fact that
judicial records list a date on which a crime was committed does
not mean that the defendant had the right to have that date found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt . . "179 This "is the critical
175. Id. at 287-89 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 289 ("Thompson's admission to having three prior burglary
convictions did not warrant a legal conclusion that the burglaries were
committed on different occasions because separate burglaries are not
necessarily committed on different occasions as a matter of law."). Judge
Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit has expressed a similar concern. See Thomas, 572
F.3d at 952-53 (Ginsburg, J., concurring):
The question whether the sentencing judge may rely solely upon an
indictment to determine the date of a prior offense without running
afoul of the Sixth Amendment . . . is more difficult than the court lets
on. . . . [A]s far as this record shows, neither Thomas's plea to one

offense nor the jury's judgment of conviction on the other entailed a
finding as to whether the offense occurred on the date charged.
177. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 292-93 n.8.
178. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 19.2-226(6) (2010) (providing that no indictment
"shall be ... deemed invalid for omitting to state, or stating imperfectly, the
time at which the offense was committed when time is not the essence of the
offense."); See also W. VA. CODE § 62-2-10 (2009) ("No indictment or other
accusation shall be quashed or deemed invalid for omitting . . . the time at
which the offense was committed."). North Carolina even specifies that
judgments are not invalid for stating the incorrect day on which the offense
was committed. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155 (2009) (providing that no judgment
shall be reversed for "omitting to state the time at which the offense was
committed in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense, nor for
stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offense to have been committed
on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment, or on an impossible day,
or on a day that never happened."). The California Penal Code allows
indictments to state that charged offenses occurred "on or about" a specific
date. CAL. PEN. CODE § 951 (2010).
179. Thompson, 421 F.3d at 293 n.9.
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point"180 because the procedural safeguards that attach to the fact
of conviction itself do not extend to the dates on which the
conviction occurred.18 1 In short, for Judge Wilkins-and Justice
Thomas-the test for whether certain facts are included in the fact
of a prior conviction, and thus fall within the prior conviction
exception, is whether those facts were originally admitted to or
pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not enough to
conclude that certain facts are "inherent" in the fact of a prior
conviction. And there is nothing "artificial" about reading the prior
conviction exception narrowly to require the government to prove
the date and time of the offenses on which it relied in seeking an
ACCA enhancement.
V.

1AKING ACCA CONSISTENT WITH THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND
THE STATUTE'S ORIGINAL PURPOSE

The problems with ACCA raised in this Article could be
solved by amending the statute to require that each prior
qualifying offense be separated by an intervening conviction or
arrest. But if we are left with ACCA in its current form, courts
must abandon the decades of case law that has accumulated
around the different occasions inquiry to comply with Apprendi's
narrow prior conviction exception and the statute's narrow
purpose.
A.

Narrowing the Scope of the Prior Conviction Exception

The prior conviction exception to Apprendi rests on shaky
constitutional ground.182 These constitutional concerns are
aggravated by an overly broad interpretation of a recidivist
statute. Under ACCA, inquiry into the occasions on which prior
offenses occurred to determine whether a defendant will be
sentenced above the statutory maximum of a 922(g)(1) violationat least five years above the maximum183-implicates the concerns
of this prior conviction exception. It is not merely the fact of three
prior convictions that will subject a defendant to an ACCA
enhancement; it is a broader evidentiary inquiry into whether the
offenses underlying those prior convictions were committed on
different occasions. There are two Sixth Amendment concerns
180. Id.
181. Id. at 293.
182. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 27-28 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("AlmendarezTorres .

.

. has been eroded by this Court's subsequent Sixth Amendment

jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that AlmendarezTorres was wrongly decided.") (referring to the four dissenting Justices in
Almendarez-Torres and himself); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489 (acknowledging
that "it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided.").
183. A person who violates 922(g)(1) "shall be ... imprisoned not more than
10 years. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).
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raised by interpreting the different occasions requirement so
broadly: (1) the date and time on which prior offenses occurred are
not always alleged in an indictment or admitted by the defendant
and such information is rarely necessary to convict; and (2) courts
often extend the different occasions inquiry beyond the mere date
and time on which the prior offenses occurred.
Because ACCA is a sentencing enhancement connected to a
violation of 922(g)(1), the government is not required to separately
charge it in an indictment; 184 although it sometimes does. 185 Often,
it is at sentencing, after a plea or a finding of guilt, when the
186
possibility of an ACCA enhancement first appears. And in cases
in which the government does allege in the indictment the prior
convictions on which it will rely for a sentencing enhancement, the
judicial record of those prior convictions may not include the date
187
As a consequence,
and time on which prior offenses occurred.
defendants are subject to sentences well beyond the maximum to
which they would otherwise be exposed, based on facts the
18 8
government has not proven, to which they have not admitted,
and of which they are not necessarily provided notice.
In determining whether prior offenses occurred on separate
occasions, courts frequently examine more than simply the date
and time when a prior offense occurred-information that, if
alleged in an indictment, would more convincingly be included in
the fact of a prior conviction. While sometimes insisting that an
189
occasion can be reduced to the date and time, courts nonetheless
examine the conduct underlying the offenses to determine, for
184. Compare the notice provision for using prior convictions to enhance a
sentence in the context of drug offenses. Under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), a person
convicted of a drug offense may not be sentenced to an increased punishment
based on a prior conviction unless the United States attorney files a notice
before trial or entry of a guilty plea stating the previous convictions on which
it will rely. Id.
185. At least one circuit has held that any facts about a prior conviction that
are used to find that prior offenses were violent felonies must be alleged in the
indictment leading to that conviction. Washington, 404 F.3d at 846-47.
186. See, e.g., Harris,447 F.3d at 1302 (stating that "[p]rior to sentencing
the probation office prepared a presentence report (PSR), concluding that
Harris's prior criminal history made him eligible for sentence enhancements
as an armed career criminal.").
187. See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1328 (noting that in its sentencing
memorandum, the government included the prior indictment that charged
three drug convictions, but "(nlone of the counts contained dates, times or
locations for the charged offenses.").
188. A defendant pleading guilty "admits" to facts in several ways: facts in
the indictment on which a plea is based; facts in a written plea agreement;
facts admitted in the plea colloquy with the district court; and facts necessary
to prove the offense charged in the indictment. See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 290
(Wilkins, J., dissenting).
189. United States v. Burgin, 388 F.3d 177, 186 (6th Cir. 2004); Thompson,
421 F.3d at 282.
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example, whether the defendant had a "breather" before deciding
to commit the next offense, 190 whether one offense ended before
the next began, 191 whether the offenses were "separate
aggressions," 192 and whether the offenses were committed in
different locations and against different victims. 193 The date and
time is often only the beginning of a court's inquiry, which
frequently involves facts that are unlikely to have been admitted
by the defendant-precisely the type of fact inquiry that implicates
the Sixth Amendment. 194
By narrowing the scope of the prior conviction exception, the
Shepard source restriction is an important safeguard of the Sixth
Amendment. Yet, although most circuits purport to apply Shepard
to the different occasions inquiry, not all agree on what constitutes
a Shepard-approved source and some still reference police reports
and other clearly inappropriate sources.19 5 In light of the Sixth
Amendment, it is not clear what constitutes an appropriate
judicial record. A sentencing judge often relies on the information
about prior convictions contained in the pre-sentence investigation
report (PSR) prepared by the federal probation office. The PSR
often includes information from police reports, complaints, and
other extra-indictment information rejected by Shepard.1 96 Even
after Shepard, courts continue to consider PSRs if the defendant
190. Stearns, 387 F.3d at 108; Washington, 898 F.2d at 442.
191. Schieman, 894 F.2d at 913; Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1095, 1098-99;
Washington, 898 F.2d at 441.
192. Davidson, 527 F.3d at 707.
193. Stearns, 387 F.3d at 104; Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1095.
194. Under the pre-2007 Sentencing Guidelines when sentences were
counted as a single occasion if the underlying offenses were part of a common
scheme or plan, the Seventh Circuit concluded that after Shepard, the inquiry
more clearly implicated the Sixth Amendment because it could easily require
determinations of facts about a prior conviction that were not based on sources
of "conclusive significance." United States v. Tek Ngo, 406 F.3d 839, 843 (7th
Cir. 2005) (noting that in determining whether the defendant's offenses were
part of a common scheme or plan and thus whether the career offender
guideline applied, the district court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right when it 'looked to the fact that the robberies were committed 10 days
apart in deciding that they were not jointly planned," and "conclude[ed] that
the elapsed time between the crimes outweighed the fact that the crimes were
'committed the same way."').
195. In one notable post-Shepard case, the Seventh Circuit permitted the
sentencing court to consider "affidavits of complaints" filed for sentencing
because they are "judicial documents, filed under oath and submitted in
furtherance of formal prosecution." United States v. Jones, 453 F.3d 777, 780
(6th Cir. 2006). Yet, Shepard explicitly prohibits the use of "complaint
applications." See also United States v. Thomas, 381 F. App'x 495, 505 (6th
Cir. 2010) (referencing police reports to conclude when and how each robbery
occurred in one night).
196. See United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir. 2005)
(finding that the PSR "appears to have relied upon both police reports and
'court documents."').
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fails to explicitly object to the facts contained within.197 Indeed,
judicial panels in the same circuit cannot agree on how closely to
scrutinize the PSR.198

Circuit courts are also in discord over how to treat a
defendant's objection. When a defendant objects to information in
the PSR, the government's burden to prove ACCA predicates
increases.199 Many courts require defendants to object to specific
facts within the PSR rather than bringing a general Shepard
challenge to a finding that their prior offenses were committed on
separate occasions. 200 Furthermore, when defendants challenge
197. See Gautier, 590 F. Supp. 2d. at 222 ("[Imf the relevant facts contained in
the PSR are uncontested, the court may consider these as further admissions
by the defendant.").
198. Compare Harris,447 F.3d at 1302, 1304 (admitting the facts in the PSR
because "[t]he time, place, and substance of the prior convictions can
ordinarily be ascertained from court records associated with those convictions.
. . .") with Taylor, 413 F.3d at 1157 (rejecting the use of the PSR because it
"appears to have relied upon both police reports and 'court documents'. . . .
[and] [t]he record ... does not tell us what these materials were and how they
were documented.").
199. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2007):
The Government's burden of proving a predicate conviction for
sentencing purposes is admittedly a "modest" one that can be satisfied
"in divers ways," including by introducing a certified copy of the
judgment, or by a statement in the PSR. However, when a defendant
challenges a conviction laid out in the PSR, more is required. This case
provides ample reason why. Brown was sentenced to five years and
three months in prison. He was arrested and taken into custody on June
18, 2002, and has presumably served all or most of his five years and
three months by now. The mandatory minimum under ACCA is fifteen
years. The Government would have us keep Brown in prison for ten
more years based on [limited information in the PSR]. . .. Indeed, as the
PSR itself states, "No information was available regarding this offense."
In the face of this reality, the Government cannot be said to have met
even its modest initial burden when it can produce nothing more.
(citations omitted).
See also Harris, 447 F.3d at 1306 ("If Harris disputed the PSR's conclusion
that he had committed three separate prior felonies, he could have objected to
the PSR, and the court would have resolved the objection by further reference
to the [charging documents, plea agreement, and judgment of conviction].").
200. See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285 (noting that although the defendant
argued that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment rights when he used
the PSR to find that his priors occurred on separate occasions, because the
defendant did not object to any specific facts in the PSR, the trial judge's use of
the PSR was permissible); Riggs, 302 F. App'x at 808 ("Riggs only objected to
the legal conclusions in light of the PSR-namely that his conviction on two
counts of first-degree robbery was a single occurrence and not two separate
and distinct convictions. Riggs failed to object to the factual contents of the
PSR . . . [t]herefore, the sentencing court here was entitled to use the
undisputed facts within the PSR to perform the requisite analysis under the
ACCA."); Harris, 447 F.3d at 1302 ("Harris did not object to the factual
assertions in the PSR" but argued instead that the different occasions inquiry
was a question for the jury; however, this issue is "properly assessed by the
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the sources of information in the PSR, some courts dismiss such
objections on the grounds that the dates on which prior offenses
occurred are "normally found in a Shepard-approved source." 201
As long as questions remain about how to interpret
Apprendi's prior conviction exception, courts should be strict in
applying Shepard to the different occasions inquiry. Specifically,
they should exclude sources of information that contain facts that
were not admitted by the defendant or were not necessary to
convict. In determining whether the defendant admitted the date
and time when prior offenses occurred or whether the prior
convictions were necessarily based on the date and time of the
offense, courts should scrutinize information in presentence
reports given their propensity to include unreliable second-hand
information. If Shepard had applied to the different occasions
inquiry in 1994, Thomas Hudspeth would have been spared the
mandatory fifteen-year ACCA sentence because the government's
ACCA case rested on information in police reports that stated the
approximate time when each prior burglary was committed. 202
B. Standardsfor Making the Different Occasions Determination
Once the facts of a prior conviction are properly before a
sentencing judge-whether the jury found those facts beyond a
reasonable doubt or the defendant admitted to those facts-the
court must determine whether the offenses underlying the prior
convictions were committed on different occasions. In his
concurring opinion in Balasesak, Judge Becker stopped short of
sentencing court."). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suggest that
broader objections should suffice as appropriate challenges. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(f)(1) ("Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the parties
must state in writing any objections, including objections to material
information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained in
or omitted from the report.").
201. United States v. Griffin, 193 F. App'x 211, 216 (4th Cir.2006). In
Griffin, the defendant challenged the use of the PSR to determine that his
prior offenses were committed on separate occasions. Even though the PSR
included information from "unspecified court records," the court rejected the
defendant's challenge both because the dates of commission are facts
"normally found in a Shepard-approved source" and Griffin had not objected to
the "accuracy" of the PSR. Id. Whatever is "normally" the case, the court
ignored Griffin's argument that in his case the PSR contained information
from non-Shepard approved sources. See also Harris,447 F.3d at 1304 ("[Tthe
separateness of prior crimes is inherent in the fact of conviction. The time,
place, and substance of the prior convictions can ordinarily be ascertained
from court records associated with those convictions . . . .").
202. See Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1018 n.3 (finding that the trial court's reliance
on police reports was acceptable in this case because "[a]s a practical matter, a
district court frequently must look beyond the charging papers and judgment
of conviction, for these documents alone rarely provide the district court with
the detailed information necessary (i.e., time, victim, location) to determine
whether multiple offenses occurred on one or more 'occasions."').
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endorsing an intervening convictions requirement, but instead
advocated that courts "insist that the government prove
convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes of which they are
part) were truly separate." 203 In Balascsak, if "all the government
has proven" is that "two burglaries 'occurred on the same night' . .
. it has not succeeded." 204 Judge Becker conceded the difficulty in
"establish[ing] a bright line . . . as to whether two days' or two

weeks' hiatus is enough," but he concluded that this case-by-case
line drawing is the "stuff of judging."205
Unfortunately, the judicial line-drawing under ACCA has
failed to consider the purpose of the statute. And since Balascsak,
it has become clear that the government can usually succeed in
securing an ACCA enhancement if they show that two prior
burglaries occurred on the same night and even in the same hour.
Until Congress requires an intervening conviction or arrest, courts
must rethink the rigid application of a specific set of factors to the
different occasions inquiry. As many courts have recognized, the
inquiry has developed to make the Petty amendment essentially
meaningless. In its place, courts should apply a test that considers
the policy objectives of ACCA: to target the small core of habitual
offenders who commit the vast majority of serious crime. An
approach like this would prevent one-night crime sprees from
triggering ACCA on their own.
In his en banc dissent in United States v. Brady,206 a Sixth
Circuit case involving an ACCA enhancement based on two prior
robberies occurring in less than one hour, Judge Jones proposed a
simple test that would ask whether two or more acts can best be
understood as "being one occasion of activity or different occasions
of activity." Instead of checking off a list of specific factors, Judge
Jones's test would consider "important concepts" such as "the
defendant's premeditation to commit several crimes at once and
general continuity of the defendant's actions." 207 Under this test,
two convictions for burglarizing one store, leaving, and
immediately thereafter burglarizing another store, would be
considered continuous actions and would not count as two ACCA
predicates. Instead of treating the period between the two
burglaries as an opportunity to cease, Judge Jones describes these
pauses in conduct as "lulls between commissions of crimes to allow
the defendant an opportunity to do certain things like reload
weapons or plot final strategies."208 In other words, these pauses
are not sharp distinctions separating different occasions of
203. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 683.
204. Id. at 685.
205. Id. at 685.

206. Brady, 988 F.2d at 675 (Jones, J., dissenting).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 675 n.10.
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activity. The "opportunity to cease" test is ultimately unsatisfying
because such an opportunity always exists on some level where
human behavior is concerned.
In an en banc dissent in Hudspeth, Judge Ripple advocated
for a case-by-case approach with ACCA's purpose in mind:
Until today, our decisions have reflected a thoughtful and measured
approach to the task required by the statute-identifying those
criminals whose repetitive behavior requires a special degree of
isolation from society.

. .

. Here, the contiguous layout of the stores,

the very short time involved in the execution of the entire plan, and
the fact that the thieves treated the operation, both in its planning
and in its execution, as a unitary matter make it, for purposes of
fulfilling the Congressional intent, similar to the robbery of the six
restaurant patrons in Petty. It stretches both the English language
and the realities of the situation to conclude that this situation was
anything other than a single occasion. 209
In response to the concern that drawing principled
distinctions on a case-by-case basis would be too difficult, Judge
Ripple, dissenting again in Schieman, compared the requirements
for the federal crime of RICO to suggest that courts can and should
consider concepts more generally than rigid factors in assessing
different occasions: "[tihe majority's suggestion that no principled
distinction is possible between a crime committed to elude
detection within ten minutes of the original crime and one
committed a day later ignores the fact that similar distinctions are
made often in our criminal law."210 Under the case-by-case
approach proposed in this Article, the court would consider the
purpose of the statute in determining whether prior offenses
represent continuous or separate actions. Although the outcomes
produced by such a case-by-case analysis would not eliminate the
inconsistencies characteristic of the current approach, on the
whole, such outcomes would be more faithful to the statute's
purpose.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The different occasions provision, as interpreted by the
courts, exacerbates the Armed Career Criminal Act's overinclusive coverage and produces unduly harsh and inconsistent
outcomes. The bill that eventually became ACCA initially called
for a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The rationale for this
extreme sentence rested on the very narrow application of the
statute to the most repetitive and dangerous offenders who become

209. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1035, 1037 (en banc) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
210. Schieman, 894 F.2d at 915 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (noting that for the
federal crime of RICO, the government must prove "continuity plus
relationship" to show a pattern of racketeering activity).
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impossible to rehabilitate. As the bill went through several
revisions before becoming law, this policy rationale remained.
The Supreme Court's ongoing interest in ACCA's residual
clause may inspire congressional intervention. If it does, Congress
should incorporate an intervening conviction requirement or an
intervening arrest requirement similar to that in the career
offender sentencing guidelines. Until then, to ensure that the
statute applies to the small core of serious repeat offenders and to
reduce its application to individuals like Thomas Hudspeth, courts
should clarify the Shepard source restriction, apply it to the
different occasions inquiry, and consider the purpose of the statute
in determining whether offenses underlying prior convictions
occurred on different occasions. As a matter of fairness, defendants
faced with such a severe mandatory penalty should have an
opportunity to challenge both the government's factual assertions
and the conclusions the court reaches based on them. Such a
proposal not only reflects a sense of fairness and accuracy; it also
may be constitutionally compelled. If the government is intent on
seeking an additional fifteen-year prison term for gun possession,
it must make the case convincingly that such a lengthy sentence is
warranted.

*

